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Article 3

By Frank R. Strong*

Levellers in Judicial Robes
Current developments disclose an upward thrust in basic conflicts over the economic fundamentals the Nation should embrace
for its material well-being. The Reagan program for drastic reductions in spending in the public service sector while augmenting expenditures for the military, threatens a major dislocation in human
services upon which millions of citizens have come to depend for a
better life. The President's promise of protection of the "truly
needy" under a "safety net" has not allayed fears of widespread
deprivation. It is no surprise that there has emerged congressional
opposition to this Republican cure for an ailing economy. For
nearly half a century, since the early years of the New Deal, the
economic teachings of John Maynard Keynes have dominated congressional policy; the use of governmental spending to undergird
the purchasing power of the economically weak in society has
been asserted to be the key to correction of society's economic ills.
As an article of faith, Keynesianism has been experiencing growing challenge by economists such as Milton Friedman, yet it continues to command powerful acceptance in some quarters.
The Reagan program of heavy tax cuts over a three-year period
has run into heavy flack in and out of Congress partly because of
presidential insistence that the cuts be across the board. The justification offered for proportional tax reduction is that the wealthy
must be encouraged by favorable treatment to provide the funds
required to stimulate capital formation in the economy. The shorthand rhetoric is that capitalists are essential to a capitalistic system. This assertion cuts across the political grain; progressive income and estate taxation, predicated on the ability to pay, has long
been a basic tenet of acceptable tax policy. For the less affluent in
society this feature of "Reaganomics" exacts too high a price for
invigorating an increasingly suspect type of economic
organization.
Cary C. Boshamer University Distinguished Professor Emeritus, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Dean and Professor of Law Emeritus,
The Ohio State University.
The author, physically restricted while recovering from a fractured hip, is
greatly indebted to Ms. Claire Bledsoe Pratt, member of the North Carolina
Bar, for assistance in the completion of this article and the footnoting.
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The Reagan program of revolutionary reductions in spending
and taxes is also at odds with a political credo pressing for acceptance by the judiciary. It manifests itself as an extension of established constitutional guarantees: total recognition of a
constitutional right is fulfilled only when accompanied by a concomitant constitutional requirement that government finance the
enjoyment of that right even though individual inability to do so is
not the fault of government but of attendant economic circumstances. Shortly stated, government must underwrite a recognized
constitutional guarantee where its full realization cannot be
achieved by the beneficiaries of the entitlement. A minority of the
Supreme Court has recently embraced this historically foreign
concept of judicial participation in setting the ranges of economic
choice for the Nation.
THE COURT AT THE CROSSROADS: RECEPTION OR
REJECTION OF LEVELLING
At issue in Harris v. McRae' was the constitutionality of the
Hyde Amendment 2 to Title XIX of the Social Security Act.3 That
Amendment forbids the use of federal funds to reimburse abortion
costs under the Medicaid program except in certain circumstances
which have somewhat varied with each congressional re-enactment since the original adoption in 1976. Unrestricted is funding of
costs related to childbirth. In Harris,the federal district court entered judgment invalidating all versions of the Hyde Amendment
for violation of the due process, equal protection, and free exercise
(but not the establishment) provisions of the Constitution. 4 On direct appeal, this judgment was reversed on the vote of five Justices, one concurring.5
Both Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court and the four dissenting opinions dealt with the several constitutional issues
raised. For present purposes, however, attention can be limited to
judicial debate with respect to the fifth amendment guarantee of
due process. A paragraph succinctly states the position of the prevailing Justices. Speaking with reference to the constitutional
1. 448 U.S. 297, rehearingdenied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980).
2. Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209,90 Stat. 1434 (1976); Pub. L No. 95205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977); Pub. L No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1586 (1978)

(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Supp. I 1979)).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (Supp. I 1979).

4. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, rehearingdenied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980).
5. Three cases consolidated on appeal also held consistent with the equal protection clause state statutory programs incorporating the Hyde-type limitation. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980). Dissents were entered in the
consolidated cases. Id. at 369.
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right to abortion in the early stages of pregnancy, vouchsafed by
Roe v. Wade,6 the majority opinion asserts that
it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a
constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the
full range of protected choices. The reason why ... [is that] although
government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of7
her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation.

Running through the dissenting opinions is attack on "the government's unequal subsidization of abortion and childbirth."8 Yet
in result they implicate a governmental obligation to equalize the
condition of rich and poor. For their premise must be that wherever the Constitution guarantees the kind of private right necessitating money for its enjoyment, government is required to finance
the realization of that right for those in society who themselves
have not the funds required to take advantage of it. This premise
Justice Stewart rejected in a second passage:
To translate the limitation on governmental power implicit in the Due Process Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress
to subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman even
if Congress had not enacted a Medicaid program to subsidize other medically necessary services. Nothing in the Due Process Clause supports
such an extraordinary result. Whether freedom of choice that is constitutionally protected warrants federal subsidization is a question for Congress to answer and not a matter of constitutional entitlement. 9
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316.
8. Id. at 297, 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See id. at 337-38 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 355-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 318 (citation omitted). The concept that there is no constitutional requirement that government compensate for economic inequalities not of its
own creation emerged from an interpretation of the protective limits of the
equal protection clause. See text accompanying notes 10-20 infra. It might
therefore be thought that by invoking the concept, Justice Stewart was relying upon the equal protection component of fifth amendment due process.
However, he turns to that component only in asserting that congressional
subsidization of other medically necessary services, while withholding federal reimbursement of most abortions, is not unconstitutional. But, despite
Justice Stewart's failure to address the entitlement theory in equal protection terms, it is doubtful that the concept will lose its equal protection base so
clearly apparent in decisions involving the financial obligations of the states.
With no equal protection clause formally applicable to Congress, the Justice may have reasoned it necessary to draw upon the equal protection component of fifth amendment due process in facing the equal protection issue
cast in the familiar form of alleged invalid discrimination. This disposition
would leave it to straight due process to absorb the concept, despite its origins in equal protection, that governmental responsibility stops with "limited
liability." Note that in the companion cases, Justice Stewart equates "the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment" with "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" in the latter's prohibition of
irrational classifications. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. at 369.
Loewy, A Different and More Viable Theory of Equal Protection, 57 N.C.L.
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Justice Stewart does not identify the source of the revolutionary view which he repudiates for the bare majority of the Court.
However, he must have had in mind the Court's opinion, written
by Justice Douglas, in Douglas v. California,O from which, in
agreement with Justice Harlan, he vigorously dissented. The constitutional issue concerned the right of the criminally accused to
assistance of counsel on first appeal from conviction. Assumed
was the right to counsel on the part of those able to retain an attorney. The question concerned the predicament of the indigent.
In Douglas, controlling analogy for the prevailing view was
found in Griffin v. Illinois," decided two years before Justice
Stewart joined Justices Douglas and Harlan on the Court. At issue
in Griffln was an Illinois practice that required a trial transcript or
its equivalent for appeal on nonfederal grounds. The majority, of
whom Justice Douglas was one, had found that both due process
and equal protection guarantees required that the state provide indigents with transcripts free of charge. Justice Harlan dissented.
He reasoned that since Illinois was not constitutionally required to
provide criminal appeals there could be no due process requirement that the state furnish a transcript. With respect to equal protection he observed: "All that Illinois has done is to fail to alleviate
the consequences of differences in economic circumstances that
exist wholly apart from any state action."12
Douglasv. Californiaextended the Griffin ruling to embrace an
indigent's right to counsel on first appeal. Again dissenting, this
time with Justice Stewart in agreement, Justice Harlan expanded
on his thesis with particular reference to equal protection:13
The States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause

from discriminating between "rich" and "poor" as such in the formulation
and application of their laws. But it is a far different thing to suggest that
this provision prevents the State from adopting a law of general applicability that may affect the poor more harshly than it does the rich, or, on the
other hand, from making some effort to redress economic imbalances
while not eliminating them entirely.

Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform basis is
more easily satisfied by the well-to-do than by the indigent. Yet I take it
that no one would dispute the constitutional power of the State to levy a
uniform sales tax, to charge tuition at a state university, to fix rates for the
purchase of water from a municipal corporation, to impose a standard fine

10.
11.
12.
13.

REV. 1,40-42 (1978), regards due process as a sounder basis than equal protection for the Griffin and Rodriguez decisions that, as considered infra, bear on
the position taken by Justice Stewart in Harris. Under Loewy's theory, the
Court would ultimately predicate its position on firmer constitutional ground.
372 U.S. 353 (1963).
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Id. at 34.
Justice Clark dissented separately from what he dubbed "this new fetish for
indigency." Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 359 (1963).
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for criminal violations, or to establish minimum bail for various categories
of offenses. Nor could it be contended that the State may not classify as
crimes acts which the poor are more likely to commit than are the rich.
And surely, there would be no basis for attacking a state law which provided benefits for the needy simply because those benefits fell short of the
goods or services that others could purchase for themselves.
Laws such as these do not deny equal protection to the less fortunate
for one essential reason: the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on
the handicaps flowing from differthe States "an affirmative duty to lift
ences in economic circumstances." 14 To so construe it would be to read
into the Constitution a philosophy of leveling that would be foreign to
many of our basic concepts of the proper relations between government
and society. The State may have a moral obligation to eliminate the evils
of poverty, but it is not required by
15 the Equal Protection Clause to give to
some whatever others can afford.

In Ross v. Moffit,16 a full decade after Douglasv. California,Jus-

tice Douglas was unable to muster a majority for extension of that
holding to further largely discretionary appeals. Meantime, indigents were successful in forcing state payment for required transcripts17 but only partially so with respect to filing fees.18
However, these decisions were reached on the technical choice of
nexi under the two-tier analysis by then fastened onto interpretation of the equal protection clause. The deeper issue adumbrated
in Douglas v. California did not rise to the surface, possibly because of the small amounts of money normally involved in transcripts and filing fees.
A decision of this period but in quite different context did, on
the other hand, again thrust to the fore the issue of judicially
forced levelling in the name of the Constitution. In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriquez,19 involving financially
disadvantaged school districts rather than individual indigency,
conflict within a badly split Court was revealed on the question
whether the State of Texas was constitutionally required under
the equal protection clause, in effect to correct by central expendiJustice Harlan here quotes from his dissent in Griffin, 351 U.S. at 34.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
417 U.S. 600 (1974).
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (transcript in non-felony case,
successful); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (transcript in aid of preliminary hearing, successful); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (transcript not necessary jurisdictionally, successful); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963) (transcript necessary to give appellate jurisdiction, successful). Contra, Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971) (special circumstances).
18. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (judicial review of administrative determinations, unsuccessful); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (voluntary bankruptcy proceedings, unsuccessful); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971) (divorce action, successful); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961)
(writ of habeas corpus, successful).
19. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
14.
15.
16.
17.
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tures the disparity in property tax base among the state's various
school districts. Opinions pro and con were cast in fadish terms:
whether the classification was suspect, whether the state interest
must be compelling, what degree of nexus must be shown. But
withal, a clearer case of debate over constitutionally enforced levelling could not arise. Justice Powell wrote the prevailing opinion
rejecting the demand. Justice Stewart, who was to write the majority opinion in Harris,by separate concurrence joined "the opinion and judgment of the Court because I am convinced that any
other course would mark an extraordinary departure from principled adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four20
teenth Amendment."
JUDICIAL LEVELLING IN ECONOMIC CONTEXT
There is of course nothing new in demands for levelling. One
recalls from English history the Levellers of the time of the
Cromwellian Interregnum. Basic to this group was the inalienability of natural rights, from which flowed the principle of popular
sovereignty and the reservation of certain fundamental powers
from the control of the elected assembly. The Levellers' doctrines
called mainly for political reforms such as extension of the voting
franchise. Yet their opposition to the monopolies of the trading
companies of that period and their criticisms of such provisions of
the existing land laws as primogeniture, had an economic base.
The True Levellers, otherwise known as the Diggers, centered
their objections on the existing economic and social order. For
them, attainment of political democracy would be inadequate without corresponding economic democracy; their goals were therefore
2
the elimination of social and economic inequalities. 1
Similar goals were espoused by the several brands of socialism
spawned by the increasing disparities in economic circumstance
that were a concomitant of the Industrial Revolution. Among them
may be identified Fabian Socialism, Marxian Socialism, Guild Socialism, and the cooperative socialism of Robert Owen. Although
differing in program and procedure, a common thread was the
curse of mounting inequality of wealth and income. Proposals for
some variant of socialism continue today.22 Native to this country
is the populist movement which, commencing with Jefferson and
Paine, has had its champions in every era of our nation's history.
20. Id. at 59.
21. A concise statement of the views of Levellers and Diggers may be found in
James, Levellers, 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 421-23 (1933).
More extensive studies are available.
22. A suggested volume is D. JAY, SOCIALISM IN THE NEW SocIETY (1962).
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A modern outcropping is A PopulistManifesto .23 In the preface to
this volume the authors declare that the "fundamental argument"
of the Manifesto "is wholly unoriginal: some institutions and people have too much money and power, most people have too little,
and the first priority of politics must be to redress that imbalance." 24 To rephrase, "Its goal is a more equitable distribution of
25
wealth and power."
That gross economic disparities exist is indisputable. Statistics
on wealth concentration are available for post-World War II. A
Pennsylvania State University economist found among the richest
one per cent of the population a relative constancy somewhat below thirty per cent for the period 1953-1972: 27.5% in 1953, 29.2% in
1965, 25.9% in 1972.26 Authors of the Manifesto claimed a mounting
concentration from twenty-one per cent in 1949 to almost forty per
cent in 1972.27 Figures such as these latter fuel the growing belief
that the rich are getting richer and the poor poorer. But even if
this is not so, gross disparity in the distribution of wealth obtains
when over one-quarter is held by one per cent of the population.
Income distribution, it was said in 1972, "has not changed for a generation: the bottom fifth of American families gets 6 per cent of the
national income, the top fifth gets 40 per cent."2 8 Carrying the statistics forward from 1972 through 1977, a current volume entitled
The Zero-Sum Society2 9 presents data from the Bureau of the Census showing that for those years "there has been essentially no
change in the distribution of money income between rich and
poor."30 Distressingly, however, the data from this later source,
calculated on a different basis of measurement, disclose a greater
income disparity for 1972 than do data quoted above from The Populist Manifesto:31 from 4.1% for the bottom quintile to 43.7% for
the top quintile. 32 The situation may worsen in the 1980's. A Wall
Street economist, Gary Shilling, predicts greater growth of income
33
among the top one-third of income receivers.
The explanation for stability in income differentials lies in the
massive income transfer payments made by government in recent
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

J. NEwFIELD & J. GREENFIELD, A POPULIST MANIFESTO (1972).
Id. at ix.
Id. at 5.
Smith, The Impact of the Estate Tax: Only the Wealthy Feel Its Bite, 4 TAx
NOTES, Apr. 26, 1976, at 19-20.
J. NEWFIELD & J. GREENFIELD, supra note 23, at 6.
Id.
L.Tmmow, THE ZERo-SUM SOCIETY (1980).
Id. at 50.
See note 27 supra.
L. Tmmow, supra note 29, at 51.
See Economic Growth and Where to Find It, Wall Street Week, Transcript,
June 5, 1981, at 12.
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times. Economist Lester Thurow is authority for the statement
that in 1978 "[o]ver 10 percent of our GNP was devoted to taking
income from one private individual and giving it to another private
individual." 34 Yet elsewhere he states that for an unidentified but
recent year "welfare constitutes only 1.2 percent of the GNP."35
Furthermore, Thurow predicts that income transfer payments cannot continue to hold the line during the 1980's and 1990's:
Given rising inequality, direct income distributions are apt to become
even more divisive than they are now. The zero-sum economic game [income transfers to some groups necessarily disadvantage others] is going
to become harder to play since more direct income transfers are going to
be demanded.
These demands may not be met, but they will have to be
36
faced.

LACK OF PRECEDENT FOR JUDICIAL LEVELLING IN
INTERPRETIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
By no stretch of justifiable interpretational freedom can either
text or context of the Constitution warrant Court entry into this
political thicket. As Justice Stewart observed in Harris,whether
federal subsidization of the poor is to be undertaken "is a question
for Congress to answer, not a matter of constitutional entitlement."3 7 Equally legislative in character is the issue of redistribution of income or wealth by the states. That this has been the
unquestioned operative principle in our governmental scheme is
attested by the vast transfers of economic buying power that have
been made through socialized legislation. In planting the germinal
seed for the constitutional doctrine that government must correct
economic inequality though not of its own doing, Justice Douglas
was true to his preference for "creating precedent, not finding it."38
34.
35.
36.
37.

L. THUow, supra note 29, at 155.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 157.
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 318.

38. W. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEAns 179 (1980). Douglas' precise wording in his

posthumous volume is that "I said I would rather create a precedent than find
one." Id. His explicit reference is to his Cardozo Lecture of 1949. See Address by William o. Douglas, The Eighth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, New York City Bar Ass'n (Apr. 12, 1949), reprinted in 4 REcoRD OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK 152 (1949). Although a
reading of that lecture in great part suggests this preference, there is no outright assertion to this effect. In the Cardozo Lecture of 1972, Erwin Griswold
took the Justice to task for his views, quoting him as having said "I'd rather
create a precedent than find one." Address by Erwin N. Griswold, The
Twenty-Ninth Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, New York City Bar
Ass'n (Nov. 21, 1972), reprintedin 28 RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR
OF THE CrrY OF NEW YORK 14 (1973). However, Griswold's citation for this
statement was to 'Transcript of Television Interview, CBS Reports, September 6, 1972." Id. at 27 nA5. A third source for the Douglas assertion comes
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One of his creations was the concept of the leveller in judicial
robes. In the words of Robert Bork, reviewing the Douglas volume,
"Mr. Douglas's urge, which became the dominant theme of the
Warren Court, was the redistribution of society's wealth, prestige
39
and political power."
In Marbury v. Madison,40 Chief Justice John Marshall staked
out for the judiciary the province of exclusive constitutional enforcement, whether defensive in the protection of the third branch
of government, or affirmative with respect to all other limitations
on governmental power imbedded in the Constitution. 4 1 In the
framing of that Instrument James Madison sought an effective
from Professor Thomas Emerson, a close friend and one-time colleague of the
Justice at Yale. "He told Eric Severeid that he would rather create a precedent himself than find one." Emerson, Justice Douglas and Lawyers With a
Cause, 89 YALE L.J. 616, 622-23 (1980).
A possible explanation for Griswold's criticism lies in what seems an inconsistent passage in the Justice's lecture. In a closing paragraph appears
the following.
From age to age the problem of constitutional adjudication is the
same. It is to keep the power of government unrestrained by the social or economic theories that one set of judges may entertain. It is to
keep one age unfettered by the fears or limited vision of another.
There is in that connection one tenet of faith which has crystallized
more and more as a result of our long experience as a nation. It is
this: If the social and economic problems of state and nation can be
kept under political management of the people, there is likely to be
long-run stability. It is when a judiciary of life tenure seeks to write
its social and economic creed into the Charter that instability is created. For then the nation lacks the adaptability to master the sudden
storms of an era. It must be remembered that the process of constitutional amendment is a long and slow one.
4 REcoRD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 152, 176
(1949).
At this point one is tempted to ask, "Will the real William 0. Douglas
please stand up?" Yet the answer is clear from his judicial opinions and his
autobiography. In a paragraph near the close of The Court Years, there is a
clear hint that as contended in the text of this article one of the "creative
precedents" he sought to impose was a redistribution of existing economic
and political power "under which the poor got poorer and the rich richer." W.
DOUGLAS, supra, at 391. Emerson, however, does not list levelling per se as
one of the major 'themes" of this unique Justice although he stresses Douglas' penchant for social change. Emerson, supra, at 622-23.
39. Bork, JusticeDouglas: His Politics Were His Law, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1980, at
28, col. 4.
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
41. Here I accept the broader reading of Marbury by Van Alstyne, A Critical
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 34-36. However, I continue to
insist that on its facts this famous case involved only a form of defensive constitutional review, and to assert that correctly viewed, full constitutional review in the affirmative sense was not established until the end of the 19th
century. Strong, JudicialReview: A Tri-DimensionalConcept of Adminstrative-ConstitutionalLaw, 69 W. VA. L REV. 111, 119-20 (1967).
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mechanism for enforcement of both direct and indirect limitations.
In the Federalist Papers he had evaluated the five devices incorporated in one or another of the original eight state constitutions, to
find each unsatisfactory.42 This finding appears to have been
rather general, based on state experience with the devices, leaving
it open for the Chief Justice to put in his bid on behalf of the
Supreme Court. The Court's successful move into the political
vacuum through exercise of constitutional review cannot be said to
have been judicial usurpation; on the other hand, supporters of
this momentous development cannot point to 43any authoritative
Of some backpopular acceptance beyond gradual toleration.
ground support was the view circulating in the New World that in
Dr. Bonham's Case44 Sir Edward Coke had asserted the power of
English courts to invalidate Acts of Parliament. The sounder view
of that landmark decision is that Coke was asserting only judicial
authority to disregard legislation of uncertain import; but this fact
did not lessen the impact45 of supposed precedent from the great
Chief Justice of England.
Whatever part Dr.Bonham's Case played in bringing about the
acceptance in this country of the power of courts to determine constitutionality as the means for enforcement of constitutional limitations, it identifies a major source of our constitutional heritage.
It was from England, despite the American Revolution, that
America inherited the concept of direct constitutional restraints,
epitomized by assurances against deprivation of life, liberty, and
property without due process of law. French contribution had
been Montesquieu's emphasis on the independence of judges that
elevated the judiciary to a plane of equality with the legislative and
executive powers of government. From this evolved the concepts
of separation of powers and federalism, which provided through
42. THE FEDERALST Nos. 48-50 (R. Fairfield ed. 1961). The devices were: annual
elections of the legislative branch, oath of constitutional support by legislators, Council of Censors, Council of Revision, and admonishment against constitutional violation by legislators. Strong, Bicentennial Benchmark: Two
Centuries of Evolution of ConstitutionalProcesses, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1, 12-17
(1976). The five devices are further examined in that article, as are the implications of the trend to resort to the judiciary for performance of the enforcement function.
43. With respect to "indirect congressional and presidential authority that may
serve as political brakes on the power of judicial [i.e., constitutional] review,
it may be fairly concluded that their highly infrequent and largely ineffective
use gravely undermines the view that the people have continuously approved
of the Court's function simply because, in the main, they have allowed the
Court to operate without constraints." Choper, The Supreme Court and the
PoliticalBranches: Democratic Theory and Practice,122 U. PA. L REv. 810,
854-55 (1974).
44. 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610).
45. Strong, supra note 42, at 18.
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friction among the several branches of government an indirect
method of constitutional restraints. 46 Levelling was alien to this
background. Nearly fifteen years ago Professor Harold Berman insightfully suggested that one hundred and fifty years after the
American Revolution, sentiments of the French Revolution were
washing the shores of American political thought, flying the tri-colors of liberty, equality, and fraternity.4 7 With such conceptions
levelling is quite compatible, and the inclusion meantime of a constitutional provision sounding in terms of equality 48 has offered seductive means for attempted legitimation of radical social views
respecting economic and political arrangements within the national community.
SUGGESTIVE ANALOGY FOR JUDICIAL LEVELLING IN
NONINTERPRETIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
Among constitutional lawyers today the great debate is
whether the Supreme Court should adhere to its accepted function
as exclusive enforcer of the Constitution or assume by its own ipse
dixit the oligarchic role of Constitution maker. On other pages I
have twice tilted a lance against the unorthodox view.49 The more
recent article identifies and examines the major predicates that
have been advanced in justification of Platonic Guardianship. One
of these calls for judicial intervention when a major foundation of
the American experiment in a free society of self-governed citizens
is judged to be in peril.
The classic illustration is the ReapportionmentCases,50 requiring for all congressional and state legislative districts literal equality in numbers of potential voters. The equal protection clause
46. 'The doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The
purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Federalism is also predicated on the
theory of limitation of governmental power through fractionization.
47. This insight was offered during celebration of Independence Day, 1967, at the
Orientation Program in American Law conducted on the Graduate Campus
of Princeton University under the auspices of the Association of American
Law Schools.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
49. Strong, supra note 42, at 112-21; Strong, Contributions of ERA to Constitu-

tional Exegesis, 14 GA. L. REv. 389 (1980).
50. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock,
377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Committee
for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo,
377 U.S. 633 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)--all foretold by
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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was forced to do service in the cause of representative democracy,
despite demonstration by dissenters that constitutional policy was
being made, not enforced. If the threat of malapportionment was
as serious as a majority of the Court believed, 5 ' there is a temptation to join the revolutionary ranks for this one type of exception to
traditional grounds for Court intervention. The absolute preconditions to this exception are: (1) breakdown in governmental polity
is threatened and (2) the political system offers no other means of
remedial action.
Informed judgment is at hand that maldistribution of income
and wealth approaches these preconditions. Some years ago an
experienced member of the federal judiciary declared: "Commission after commission on crime, race, violence, or children has recommended some sort of income redistribution as the only way to
solve our toughest social problems. I am convinced that nothing
else can begin to work without it."52 Reinforcing this judgment as
to the ultimate causation of crime, the authors of the Manifesto
have stated: "We share the belief that the fundamental sources of
crime are rooted in the pathology of poverty: jobless, purposeless
men and women, broken families, a school system that does not
educate, and the consequent epidemic of alcoholism and drug ad51. On several occasions Chief Justice Warren orally stated that in his judgment
Baker v. Carr, rather than Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
was the outstanding decision of his chief justiceship. This view is recorded in
his memoirs. E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977). In ex-

plaining this judgment Warren went on to write that "[t] he reason Iam of the
opinion that Baker v. Carr is so important is because I believe so devoutly
that, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln's famous epigram, ours is a government
of all the people, by all the people, and for all the people." Id. at 308 (emphasis in original). But this was not Lincoln's language in the Gettysburg Address; there were no "alls" let alone any italicization. With due respect it
must be said that Warren altered, rather than paraphrased, the meaning of
Lincoln's celebrated words. Lincoln's concern was the preservation of the
American experiment with citizen sovereignty. It is inconceivable that his
mind was on the perplexing issue of choice among competing theories as to
the proper basis of legislative representation in a democracy.
To my satisfaction there is here further indication that the majority in the
Reapportionment Cases went beyond any faithful enforcement of the written
Constitution by embracing a radical theory that the Court somehow has the
"creative" duty to make constitutional law when a basic pillar of the American plan of government is by it judged to be in peril. The remainder of this
article tests this theory in the context of growing evidence that maldistribution of wealth and income in the United States is a much more serious ultimate threat to the American scheme.
52. Address by Judge David L. Bazelon, Juvenile Justice: Love-Hate Story, summarized in, 9 TRA4,July-Aug. 1973, at 58. Currently Judge Bazelon writes
he roots of street crime lie in poverty plus." Bazelon, Crime: Toward
that "[t]
a Constructive Debate, 67 A.B.A.J. 438, 442 (1981).
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diction." 5 3 Of many assertions of the seriousness of the situation
is this paragraph in a pamphlet of the League of Women Voters:
But real welfare reform must remedy the current system's most flagrant
flaw-the failure to provide adequately for the nation's poor. The real
question cannot be whether or not to end poverty but how best to proceed.
For a nation as rich as ours can no longer tolerate a system that allows 26
million people, including 11 million children, to live in "official" povertya decent start in life,
suffering malnutrition and poor health, deprived of
54
and outside the mainstream of American society.

To the extent that there is a relationship between income and
wealth inequality on the one hand and increasing crime, street violence, racial unrest, and broken homes with "lost" children on the
other, economic disparity becomes a serious national problem. If,
as may legitimately be feared, there is in this predicament a true
threat to the open society that has been a prized value of the
American lifestyle, then we face a likely breakdown in political
governance more disruptive than were the hazards of extreme
malapportionment.
The Reapportionment Cases provide a close precedent for
Court-enforced levelling not only because the underlying justification for judicial involvement would be the same, but also for the
reason that voter inequality is involved in each instance. Consumer demand expressed in the marketplace represents economic
voting as surely as does political voting at the polling place. When
inequalities in income and wealth skew levels of purchasing power
within the citizenry, the result is, functionally, identical to malapportionment in voting districts. In terms of demand for goods and
services registered through exercise of purchasing power, the
"vote" of those with greater economic substance weighs heavier
than the "vote" of the poorer classes. The total resulting market
demand no more registers societal economic need than does political voting in malapportioned districts achieve accurate registration of political preference. Socialist theory has long pointed out
the fallacy of correct identification of social needs where the economic expression of wants is distorted by inequality of voting
power in the marketplace. In each instance there is "malapportionment" in the sense of maldistribution of economic/political
power.
The only distinction between the two situations, from the point
53. J. NEWFTELD & J. GREENFnLD,supra note 23, at 137.

54. 'To Promote the General Welfare".. . Unfinished Agenda, League of Women Voters Education Fund, No. 187 (1977). "The concentration of great
wealth in a few hands is incompatible with democracy." Statement of the
Taxation with Representation Fund before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Estate and Gift Taxation, May 1, 1981, reprinted in 10 Taxation With
Representation Newsletter, No. 5 (May 1981).
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of view of Court intervention, lies in the remedial rather than substantive sphere. Judicial insistence upon voting districts of equal
population was achieved through exercise of the familiar act of judicial nullification. However, this remedy would often not suffice
in Court-enforced levelling. Invalidation would not itself have
been sufficient in Rodriguez and Harris; there would have also
been the question of judicial power to redirect appropriations
against legislative judgments. Fully affirmative decrees would
often be requisite to involuntary transfer payments of governmental funds. But while remedial measures at first blush pose an obstacle to full-scale judicial levelling, review of developments over
the past twenty years reveals such major expansion in judicial
remedies for effectuation of constitutional determinations as to
leave the issue open.
THE PROBLEM WITH REMEDIES IN JUDICIAL LEVELLING
It will be recalled that one reason for Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v. Carr,5 5 the precursor of the Reapportionment
Cases, lay in his concern over the difficulty or impossibility of devising effective judicial remedies in this class of case.5 6 "Surely,"
he thought, "a Federal District Court would not itself remap'the
State" 57 in the face of legislative resistance. Yet exactly that has
occurred, with no eyebrow raised over judicial behavior earlier
thought to be quite inappropriate, if not beyond judicial authority.
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg has called attention to another type of
remedial situation, one in which the Court restructures legislation
in order to save it from invalidation. 58 Her analysis concerns gender-based legislation that is unconstitutional by reason of underinclusiveness. The choice before the Court as a matter of remedy is
either to invalidate or to extend the reach of the offending law to
achieve validity, even though the latter alternative involves "a bit"
of judicial legislating. In some fact patterns repair by extension
adds burden to the state or federal fisc, yet this has not deterred
the Court.
Instanced is the decision in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,59 involving a provision of the Social Security Act. As enacted by Congress,
the law authorized monthlypayments to a surviving widow and
child where the wage earner had been the father. To save the provision from invalidation the Court extended it to include like pay369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Id. at 327 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 328 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on JudicialAuthority to Repair Unconstitutional
Legislation, 28 CLav. ST. L Rav. 301 (1979).
59. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
55.
56.
57.
58.
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ments to a surviving father and child where the wage earner had
been the mother. Judge Ginsburg states that "HEW price-tagged
the 'child in care' benefits at stake in Wiesenfeld at 20 million
dollars annually, a figure escalating to some 500 million, the Solicitor General claimed, if very closely analogous social security gender lines 60
should be held unconstitutional and repaired by
extension."
Decisions in the Fifth Circuit provide outstanding examples of
judicial direction of money payments by government. Some have

concerned existing disparity between blacks and whites with respect to municipal services; others, inadequacies in state care of
mental illness and mental retardation. 6 1 In the latter the remedial
decrees enforcing the judicial standards set were not only adminis-

tratively detailed, but impinged upon legislative prerogative by directing the voting of appropriations and threatening levy of taxes
and the sale of state property. The comment of Professor Cox is
pointed: "Thus, an individual federal judge became, in effect, the
chief executive or administrator of Bryce Hospital. He also superseded the judgment of the Alabama Legislature in appropriating
62
funds and, indirectly, in issuing bonds or levying taxes."
With the Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education63 decision, forced busing to achieve racially integrated schools

became a familiar judicial remedy in the Supreme Court's drive to
destroy the dual system of public schooling, an effort begun with
Brown v. Board of Education I and 1.l64 Such judicial decrees re60. Ginsburg, supra note 58, at 305 (footnote omitted).
61. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Mississippi, 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss.
1969), rev'd, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), affd en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir.
1972) (municipal services); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.
1972) (mental illness and mental retardation). Background is provided in
Strong, supra note 42, at 109-11.
62. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 97
(1976). The latest instance from the Fifth Circuit of federal judicial intervention in state political affairs is Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir.
1981). Involved was the question whether an unoccupied seat on the Georgia
Supreme Court could be filled by gubernatorial appointment or required a
special election. The cost of the latter was estimated at one million dollars.
Decision turned on whether a justice had withdrawn from or had vacated his
office. By Georgia statute withdrawal called for special election, whereas the
Georgia constitution specified gubernatorial appointment in case of vacancy.
Challenge of appointment to the open position was sustained by the federal
district and appellate courts. In so holding, the statute was judicially stretched to include the term "vacancy" within that of "withdrawal," an explicit provision of the constitution disregarded, and due process invoked. It is reliably
reported to me that the state is depending on delays in enforcement until the
general election of 1982. Meantime, an interim successor sits, as decreed by
the court of appeals.
63. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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quire expenditure by local authorities of great sums of tax revenue. A direct order for pay-out of tax revenues came with Milliken
v. Bradley 11,65 in litigation concerning the Detroit dual school system. There the federal district court required, as a means toward
achievement of a unified school system, introduction into the program of four educational components-reading, in-service teacher
training, testing, and counseling. Sustainment of this directive is
of especial significance because the Supreme Court rejected, in addition to other contentions, attack on the requirement that the
state defendants pay prospectively one-half of the additional cost
attributable to the four components. Defendants had argued that
the requirement was, "in practical effect, indistinguishable from an
award of money damages against the state based upon the asserted prior misconduct of state officials" and therefore constituted an award violative of the eleventh amendment.6 6 Milliken II
thus effects a clear differentiation between money awards of prospective application and those of retrospective application.
Whatever the lingering obstacle to enforcement of the latter type,67
the bar of the eleventh amendment is down for prospective money
judgments-the type pertinent to levelling by judicial mandate.
Similar atrophy may be expected in the sovereign immunity of the
United States historically found in the constitutional design.68
A more serious impediment to judicially forced transfer payments does remain. Article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution
of the United States reads in forepart: "No money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law... ." Provisions to like effect are to be found in some state
constitutions. 69 Unquestionably, the reference is to appropriations
made by the legislative branch; there is therefore no doubt of the
constitutional existence of outright condemnation of direct judicial
demands on the public fisc. The very explicitness of the constitutional wording probably accounts for the paucity of relevant case
authority. Only a few decisions of the last century, together with
three recently from lower federal courts, warrant attention.
NationalAssociation ofRegional Councilsv. Costle7 Oinvolved a
65. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
66. Id. at 289.
67. The latest Court struggle with the issue is Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida
Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147 (1981).
68. The diminishing fortunes of the defense of sovereign immunity, state and
federal, are the subject of considerable commentary. My own is found in
Strong, 14 GA. L. REV., supra note 49, at 402-07.
69. E.g., ALA. CoNsT. art. IV, § 72; ARK. CoNsT. art. 5, § 29; IND. CoNsT., art. 10, § 3;
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 17; N.J. CoNsT. art. 8, § 2, para 2. No effort has been
made to survey all state constitutions.
70. 564 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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dispute over the reach of judicial jurisdiction with respect to the
availability of federal funds after statutory lapse of budget authority. An able bench of circuit judges determined that courts possess
the power to enforce further payments "if equity so requires," provided the unobligated budget authority has not lapsed before suit
7
is brought. 1
If, however, budget authority has lapsed before suit is brought, there is no
underlying congressional authorization for the court to preserve. It has
vanished, and any order of the court to obligate public money conflicts
with the constitutional provision vesting sole power to make such authori-

zation in the Congress. Equity empowers the courts to prevent the termination of budget authority which exists, but if it does not exist, either
because it was never provided or because it has terminated, the Constitution prohibits the courts from creating it no matter how compelling the
equities. 72

Costle leaves no doubt as to where lies the exclusive power of appropriation of moneys in the United States Treasury.
More relevant are the two federal district court decisions that
faced the question in attacks on the Hyde Amendment itself. In
Doe v. Mathews 73 a temporary restraining order to prohibit implementation of the Hyde Amendment was denied on several
grounds, one being the pertinent language of Article I, section 9,
clause 7. The court noted that neither in this challenge nor in cited
precedent had plaintiffs raised the constitutional issue: "Yet, it
cannot be avoided because, on the record before the Court, the
Congress simply has not appropriated any moneys for fiscal 1977 to
reimburse Medicaid States with a federal share for elective abortions." 74 Sua sponte the court observed:
[I] t has long been the law, as it must be in light of the clear and explicit
language of the constitution, that no officer may pay an obligation of the
United States without an appropriation for that purpose, and no mandamus may issue to that end. Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. 272, 52 U.S. 272, 13
L. Ed. 693 (1851); Collins v. U.S., 15 Ct. Cl. 22 (1879); Contractsof Extension
5
of Capitol, 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 28 (1853).7

This precedent would seem to have concluded the constitutional issue. For even if the district judge were to find the Hyde
Amendment invalid, he was troubled over his authority to require
the disposition of appropriations that the congressional action had
sought to forbid. However, the judge's familiarity with New Jersey
law recalled to him the
highly analogous situation in Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457
(1976). There, the Supreme Court of New Jersey was faced with the prob71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
420
Id.
Id.

at
at
F.
at
at

588.
588-89 (footnote omitted).
Supp. 865 (D.N.J. 1976).
870.
871.
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lem of finding a constitutional vehicle for providing a remedy to carry out

its underlying ruling that existing State arrangements for funding the free
public schools did not comply with State constitutional requirements.
Recognizing that it could not appropriate money (N.J.Const.1947, Art. 8, § 2
par. 2 contains a provision essentially the same as that involved here), it
entered an order directing that no State, county or local official was to expend any moneys for the free public schools until the legislature had appropriated
funds conforming to the standards laid down by the underlying
76
ruling.

Challenges to discrepancies in the dollar-per-pupil input into
public school education by different school districts within the
same state were a familiar facet of the general drive for greater
equality that marked a decade ago. Two leading decisions were
Serrano v. Priest,7 7 affording relief under the equal protection
clause of the California constitution, and San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,78 in which the United States
Supreme Court sustained deficiencies in the Texas school system
against attack under the equal protection clause of the Federal
Constitution. A third major decision was Robinson v. Cahill,79 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1973. Although debating the predicates of both Serrano and Rodriquez, that court
invalidated the New Jersey disparities as inconsistent with article
VIII, section 4, paragraph 1 of the state constitution of 1947: "The
Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in this State between the ages of five and
eighteen years." 80
By a supplemental opinion shortly thereafter, the New Jersey
court, troubled by the question of remedies in case of legislative
resistance, in effect gave the state legislature through December
31, 1974, to enact legislation consistent with its substantive judgment.8 1 When the legislature failed to meet this deadline, the
court in early 1975 ordered full argument on the question of remedies but allowed existing financing to continue for 1975-76.82 In
May of the same year, the court ordered a provisional remedy for
the school year 1976-77 that would afford relief from the continuing
unconstitutional system of financing.8 3 It ruled that directions to
76. Id.
77. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907

(1977).
78. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
79. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
80. Id. at 515-20, 303 A.2d at 295-98.

81. Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973) (per curiam), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 976 (1973).
82. Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975).

83. Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975).
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state officers to allocate monies in accordance with this relief program did not violate the appropriations clause of the state constitution.84 "The funds, ex hypothesi, will be appropriated by the
Legislature. They will still be used for educational purposes, but
in a manner we have concluded to be an essential and minimal
interim step in the enforcement of the Education Clause."8 5 The
court ruled that should there be deemed a conflict between the two
constitutional clauses, the education clause would control. There
were three dissents. Two justices opposed the court's entrance
into the business of financing public education.8 6 To them, the majority action was violative not alone of the appropriations clause
but also of the separation of powers clause of the state constitution.87 The other justice dissented out of dissatisfaction with the
majority position believing it was not sufficiently curative. For
him, stalemate within the executive and legislative branches did
not excuse the judiciary from eliminating the existing educational
inequalities. "We, too are bound by the mandates of the Constitution.... To vindicate the rights guaranteed by the education
clause we must make great breakers, and, if need be, tidal

waves." 88

The response of the New Jersey Supreme Court to this clarion
call came in the 1976 decision of that court 89 to which the federal
district judge had called attention in Doe v. Mathews. The tidal
wave that ensued, forcing the closure of all the state's public
schools if the legislature did not do the judicial will, was too much
even for the dissenter who had called for sweeping action. However, he did not abandon his earlier position that dollar equality
among school districts must be achieved in compliance with the
state constitution's education clause. Again dissenting, he avoided
conflict with the appropriation clause by proposing to order local
tax assessors to assess "ratables" to the extent necessary to fund
local school budgets at levels "essential for the maintenance of a
thorough and efficient system of education." 9 0 His solution reminds of the orders issued in the Fifth Circuit, described earlier in
this analysis of judicial remedies.9 '
As for the federal district judge in Doe, the ultimate action of
84. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 2, para. 2.

85. Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. at 354, 339 A.2d at 203-04.
86. Id. at 374, 339 A.2d at 215 (Mountain, J., and Clifford, J., dissenting).
87. N.J. CONST. art. IM para. 1.
88. 67 N.J. at 374,339 A.2d at 214 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting).

89. Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976). It is known as Robinson v.
Cahill V, in light of the four previous decisions identically styled.
90. Id. at 171, 358 A.2d at 465 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
91. See text accompanying note 61 supra. A broad ranging account of Fifth Circuit activity is presented in BAss, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
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the New Jersey Supreme Court was too radical, at least in the circumstances he faced:
The Robinson v. Cahill order initiated a constitutional confrontation
whose reverberations will echo for decades to come. Such confrontations
erode the foundations of the constitutional structure in ways and to an
extent that no one can forecast. The judicial branch, in particular, being
that branch which decides issues of constitutional law in the last resort, is
exposed to the greatest risk of all the branches if it goes too far; if it goes
beyond that indefinable line where its judgment has no force and cannot
be carried out. And, if it attempts to design a remedy like that in Robinson
v. Cahill, it may find that it has destroyed the pattern of accommodation
between the branches of government upon which the working of government depends. The doctrine of separation of powers in no way prevents
all three branches from pulling together toward the same common goal.
But when the three branches pull apart in separate
and different direc92
tions, the structure of government itself is at risk.

Very significantly, nonetheless, the New Jersey Supreme Court
stuck to its guns, and the state legislature capitulated within two
months. Thereupon, the court entered an order vacating its injunction.93 Clearly, here is judicial levelling approximating the ultimate in remedial measure.
In the second challenge to the constitutionality of the Hyde
Amendment, plaintiffs were more successful in the federal district
court. Litigation in McRae v. Mathews9 4 resulted in obtainment of
an injunction against withholding of reimbursement for elective
abortions. Clearly predisposed to the view of the Amendment's invalidity, which later eventuated in such a holding in McRae v.
Califano,95 the district court found a way to reconcile with the
Constitution judicially decreed redirection of congressional appropriations under Medicaid. The court concluded:
The contention that an order requiring continued payment for lawful abortions would be an illicit attempt to appropriate funds from the Treasury
cannot be sustained. The language of the Act makes clear that Congress
has appropriated what it judges sufficient money for carrying out Title
XIX and that it has sought only to restrict the circumstances in which the
funds can be used to pay providers of lawful abortional services. If that
prohibition of use transgresses constitutional rights, it cannot be given effect. Payment of funds will follow, but not by an act equivalent to appropriation. United States v. Lovett, 1946, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S. Ct. 1073, 90 L.Ed.
1252, dealt with a section of an appropriation act which, similarly, forbade
the use of any part of the money appropriated by the Act for a specific
purpose-in that case, the payment of salaries to three federal employees
who had been accused of being "subversives." The Court held that the
prohibitory section did not bar the payments of the employees' salaries
because the section was unconstitutional as, in substance, a bill of attain92.
93.
94.
95.

Doe v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. at 872.
Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 916 (1977).
491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd sub nom. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980).
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der. Counsel for the Congress argued unsuccessfully the exclusive and
complete control of the Congress over the disbursing process and that the
issues raised by the section were not justiciable. So here, the section is a
constraint on the use of appropriated funds, and, if the constraint here is
one that cannot be lawfully imposed for constitutional reasons, as it was in
is here no bar to the payment of the money for aborLovett, then there
96
tional services.

One may question, however, whether Lovett constitutes valid
precedent in the present circumstances. Although the congressional move to cut off governmental compensation of Lovett, Watson, and Dodd took the form of a section of an Urgency Deficiency
Appropriation Act, the Court refused to regard it as "a mere appropriation measure" because of overwhelming evidence of House
suspicion that the men were "subversives." 97 The Court made it
clear that the run of congressional appropriations is beyond judicial scrutiny. However, finding constitutional taint in the form of a
bill of attainder, the Court ruled that Congress could not lawfully
prevent the three from enforcing their contractual rights by suit
for their salaries in the Court of Claims. Those seeking funds for
elective abortions possess no such underlying legal rights. Invalidity of the congressional action in the Lovett situation also lay in its
invasion of presidential removal power. Functionally, the case is
of a pattern with the leading decision in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States,9 8 where dismissal of a member of the Federal Trade
Commission had been attempted by President Franklin Roosevelt.
With the shoe on the other foot, that effort was held to be beyond
the removal power of the Chief Executive, which must be shared
with the Congress.9 9 Nevertheless, Commissioner Humphrey's
Executor was successful in suit in the Court of Claims for salary
owing through the end of the seven-year term for which Humphrey
had been appointed by President Hoover.100
But even if this distinction be passed over, and Lovett treated
as full precedent in support of a lower federal court's order "for
continued payment of lawful abortions," it remains true that judicial authority to intervene in fiscal matters has been pressed only
to the extent, already reached by the Supreme Court, of partial reMcRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. at 540.
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946).
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Congress cannot exercise the whole of the removal power as it attempted to
do in Lovett, or even share it with the President in the case of presidential
appointees exercising only executive authority. Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52 (1926). But it can affect removal policy by restricting the conditions
on which the President may remove where the appointee is exercising quasilegislative or quasi-judicial authority. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349
(1958); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. at 610-11.
100. Estate of Humphrey, 81 Ct. Cl. 969 (1935).
96.
97.
98.
99.
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direction of monies previously appropriated by Congress. If the
Court is to attempt bolder levelling, it must test its power to exercise far greater authority over appropriations of public monies. It
may never attempt a direct order to the Treasurer of the United
States to pay out revenues on its commands, employing the contempt power as an enforcement mechanism. Yet there are means
of indirect achievement of similar goals, such as the radical steps
taken by the New Jersey Supreme Court and the daring directives
in the Fifth Circuit.' 0 In view of the degree of judicial ingenuity
disclosed by legal history with respect to the fashioning of innovative remedies for new rights at common law and in equity, it would
be shortsighted to underestimate the possibilities with respect to
constitutional law. Here, preeminently, the future is not likely to
tolerate "a right without a remedy."
JUDICIAL LEVELLING IN POLITICAL CONTEXT
Less than twenty years now separate us from a new century.
Formally, the intervening period will be marked by recognition of
two hundred years since "the miracle at Philadelphia," the Instrument's ratification, the launching of the new Government, the addition of the Bill of Rights, and the first recall by constitutional
amendment of a constitutional determination by the United States
Supreme Court.10 2 But the period promises to be far more one of
soul searching about the future. There exists great concern respecting the operation of the legislative branch of the federal government. The quality of representation, as envisioned by the
Founders, has seemingly lost its effectiveness. Lester Thurow reflects the view of many that legislative paralysis in treating our ec101. Columnist Anthony Lewis has related the facts of the Boston School shutdown dilemma in the Spring of 1981 to illustrate an instance of bold judicial
intervention in the political arena. He commends the action of Federal Judge
Morse in forbidding closure before the end of the school term, thus forcing
public officials to find funds for continuation. Undoubtedly recalling the decrees of Judge Johnson in the Fifth Circuit, Lewis observes that "[t]here is

particular criticism of court orders requiring state financial action, for example, to relieve bestial conditions in mental hospitals and other institutions."
Yet when there is stalemate in the political process, as there was in Boston,
he suggests "that careful judicial intervention can actually help, not hinder,
the political process." However, he concludes that "in the end" courts cannot
resolve the financial problems of governmental units. Lewis, When Politicians Fail, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1981, at A35, col. 1. The column was reproduced in at least one local newspaper under the title Lewis, Judges Step in
Where PoliticiansFearto Tread, The Chapel Hill Newspaper, May 8, 1981, at
4, col. 2. Shades of Alexander Pope!
102. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI, recalling Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793).
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onomic and social problems has already set in.103
One apparent cause of congressional stalemate is the dominance of one-issue political action committees. Their effect appears to be the polarization of positions on legislative policy that
results in either inadequate resolution of conflicts or, worse, none
at all (zero sum). Former Senator George McGovern laments the
appearance in the New Right of an intolerance and vindictiveness
that destroys the quality of flexibility which makes possible the
compromises essential to policy-making in our pluralistic society.104 To the extent this criticism is valid, it could provoke a like
reaction in a New Left that would then surely sap the representational mechanism of all vitality. Thurow is convinced that to get off
dead-center with respect to needed economic objectives, such as
guaranteed full employment, requires abandonment of the presidential system for the parliamentary.105 Such drastic restructuring of our political framework has long been debated on the level
of political theory but never seriously considered operationally.
Yet there has emerged a deeper dissatisfaction with the representational vehicle for registering voter preference. Today there is
afoot a proposal for a constitutional amendment to authorize direct
national initiative. Wide-ranging disaffection with the extent to
which Congress is influenced by special interest groups has
brought about strong, bipartisan support for the proposal, now cast
in the form of resolutions before Congress.06
A weakened Congress if not somehow revitalized can be a
temptation toward aggrandizement by other power sources in the
governmental scheme. While return to the threat of an imperial
presidency seems unlikely, expansion of executive authority is
nearly inevitable. 107 Events of the past year are indicative of the
popular appeal of a strong, managerial executive. In politics as in
physics there is abhorrence of a vacuum. Older citizens will recall
the first two presidential terms of Franklin Roosevelt, when Congress, faced with the Great Depression, surrendered its authority
103. L. Thuaow, supra note 29, at 24-25.
104. McGovern, The New Right and the Old Paranoia,126 CONG. REc. S 15649
(daily ed. Dec. 4, 1980).
105. L. TmnUow, supra note 29, at 212-14.
106. See Questions and Answers on National Voter Initiative, National Voter Initiative Amendment, Washington, D.C. (1979). The National Advisory Board of
this organization includes five senators and five congressmen. In the present
Congress there are four resolutions on the House side. H.R.J. Res. 34, 67, 115,
147, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H 69, H 70, H 176, H 255 (1981). No. 67
varies somewhat from the wording of the other three.
107. Among concise commentaries is that of J. Mills & F. Baldwin, Presidential
Accountability, League of Women Voters Education Fund, No. 578 (1975).
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to become a rubber stamp for Rooseveltian direction of the nation.
Professor Arthur Miller has recently written:
The President is not merelyprimus interparesin the tripartite division of
powers; he is primus. Period. Whoever lives in the White House, of
whatever party, will continue to be the focal point of attention-and of
actual governing power. The troubles of President Carter, so obvious in
1978, should not be taken as the norm.
Presidents will, to be sure, have to negotiate with Congress and with
the bureaucracy, which is a force in its own right. But there can be no
doubt that, in terms of formal authority as well as effective control, the
reins of government are in the hands of the man [sic!] living at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, not in the hands of those who work on Capitol Hill. No
government of any consequence in the world is run otherwise. The spare
generalities of Article 11 do not begin to demonstrate the range and nature
of presidential power. Executive power, of course, has come without
amendment; it has both been seized by the Executive and delegated to the
public administration, including the President, by a Congress only too
willing to forego scrutiny of the myriad details of routine problems of
governance. 1 0 8

Less apparent because more subtle would be judicial aggrandizement. The times seem favorable for expanding judicial power.
Despite criticism of the administration of the criminal law, one
senses in society great faith in courts as dispensers of substantive
justice. There is encouragement by influential writers of the view
that the decisional methodology of the common law is equally satisfactory for constitutional adjudication.10 9 No concern is evident
over the crucial difference that when exercised at the constitutional level neither electorally accountable representatives nor the
voters in direct action by initiative have, short of the cumbersome
process of constitutional amendment, the power to reject judicially
announced policy.11O The explanation for this indifference seems
to lie in the existence of a growing persuasion that policy formulation by judicial action is little less democratic than that of repre108. Miller, ConstitutionalLaw: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm, 39 Ono
ST. L.J. 736, 739 (1978).
109. Jones, The Brooding Omnipresence of ConstitutionalLaw, 4 VT. L. Rv. 1, 2029 (1979), discussed in Monaghan, ProfessorJones and the Constitution,4 VT.
L. REv. 87 (1979); Wright, Professor Bicke Scholarly Tradition, and the
Supreme Court, 84 HARv. L. REv. 769, 778 (1971); Lecture by Edward H. Levi,
Session on American Law and Legal Institutions, at Salzburg Seminar in
American Studies (July 1980). My discussion of "Constitutional Common
Law" can be found in Strong, supra note 42, at 413-16.
110. The constitutionalizing of common law methodology as a predicate for constitutional noninterpretivism is effectually refuted to my satisfaction by Posner,
The UncertainProtectionof Privacyby the Supreme Court, 1979 SuP. CT. REV.
173,196 n.63. The analysis advanced by Posner is excellent for its keen disclosure of the decisional steps by which the Court majority fashioned, in what
Justice White dissenting in Roe's companion case categorized as "an exercise
of raw judicial power," its claim to legislate at the constitutional level. Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973).
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sentation-based organs of government. Some years ago Judge J.

Skelly Wright was hailed by many for his candid assertion of this
view."' More recently Archibald Cox in his Lectures at Oxford enlarged on the same view in a paragraph that warrants continued
thought. Cox was challenging Learned Hand's celebrated statement that he would find it "most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic Guardians;" that however little his exercise of the
franchise weighed, "when I go to the polls I have a satisfaction in
the sense that we are all engaged in a common venture."' 12 Declared Cox:
I should be no less irked than Judge Hand if the Supreme Court were to
void an ordinance adopted in the open town meeting in the New England

town in which I live-a meeting in which all citizens can participate-but I
should have little feeling about a statute enacted by the Massachusetts
legislature in the normal political pattern, and none about a law made in
that normal pattern by the Congress of the United States. Perhaps my
sense of the matter is distorted by years of advocacy in constitutional
cases, but it appears to me that modern government is simply too large
and too remote, and too few issues are fought out in election, for a citizen
to feel much more sense of participation in the legislative process than the
lessen my sense that
judicial. Nor does the Supreme Court's intervention
113
we are all engaged in a common adventure.

With this reconciliation of constitutional review with democratic
tenets, a basis is established for rationalizing advance from interpretive to noninterpretive constitutionalism. By this feat of legerdemain the Supreme Court is released from the constriction of
traditional constitutional review, wherein permissible bounds are
limited to enforcement of the text and context of provisions of the
written Constitution. The new view, brought to full flower in Roe v.
Wade, is that of the Court free to formulate policy for the country,
employing the written document only as a starting point for deliberation, much as a court at common law proceeds from precedent
to the creative task of reshaping doctrine to accommodate the law
to changing circumstances. Whether this new dimension in judicial power will be tolerated has since Roe been said to be the great
issue of today in constitutional law.
But "today" may already be yesterday in the fast-moving time
frame with which constitutional theorists must be concerned. This
is the significance of Harris,in which the Justices faced the momentous issue of whether government is obliged to implement
Court decisions not only by traditional means but also through
fiscal underwriting, even in those instances like Roe where economic circumstances rather than governmentally induced discrim111. Wright, The Role of the Court in a Democratic Society-JudicialActivism or
Restraint?54 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 9-11 (1968).
112. L HAND, THE BUL OF RIGHTs 73-74 (1958).
113. A. Cox, supra note 62, at 116.
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ination prevent full enjoyment by beneficiaries of a newly declared
constitutional right. The majority position in Harris is strikingly
similar to that of the majority in National League of Cities v.
Usery." 4 In each a halt was called to the seemingly relentless
march of constitutional doctrine. And just as Usery has received
biting criticism from within and without the Court, so has Harris.

Professor Michael Perry's insistence that Harris is plainly wrong
in light of Roe," 5 if valid, but proves the point that somewhere
there must be an end to the annihilation of those limits on judicial
power intended by the Founders and accepted for nearly 200 years.
Only one additional advance is required for the Court to enjoy
boundless freedom to dictate economic as well as political and social policy for the nation: that is for the Court directly to order
levelling appropriations without first bothering with the two-step
process of creating ipse dixit new constitutional rights and then
requiring in the name of the Constitution, the fiscal outlays necessary to implement those decrees.
LEVELLING: A THICKET TO BE JUDICIALLY ESCHEWED
It is datum that none can foretell how the coming years will unfold. Since 1973, the year of Roe, there has been but a single in-6
stance of Court indulgence in acknowledged noninterpretivism."
Because this concerned a new area of exercise in constitutional
creativity, it may augur further toying by the Court with noninterpretive review. On the other hand, the Court has recently rejected
extended applications of its self-fashioned constitutional dictates,
twice with respect to Roe v. Wadel 1 7 and once as to Reynolds v.
Sims," 8 in the face of strong internal dissent and outside criticism.
If Mr. Dooley is correct that the Court follows the 'iliction" returns, the prevalent conservative trend may counsel a waiting period before there is attempted another assertion of judicial power
to "bring the Constitution up to date."
Of all further Court experiments in noninterpretivism, the one
most at odds with historically grounded principles of constitutionally limited representative democracy would be Court intervention
in the socioeconomic pattern of the country under the banner of
judicially enforced fiscal egalitarianism. I am one who fears ultimate societal collapse from the growing disparity in income and
wealth; the instability in those countries of the world where tre114. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
115. Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment
Case: A Brief Comment on Harrisv. McRae, 32 STAN.L. REV. 1113 (1980).
116. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
117. ILL. v. Matheson, 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
118. Ball v. James, 101 S. Ct. 1811 (1981).
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mendous disparity exists is not a lesson to be ignored. But I cannot believe that this dangerous dilemma can be wisely resolved
through judicial levelling in the name of a Court-fashioned constitutional mandate. If and when disparity in our prevailing economic system becomes no longer tolerable, requiring that a more
economically egalitarian society be substituted, the fundamental
alteration should be made by society's citizens-hopefully by
peaceful means through super-majority acceptance. Surely a nation founded on popular sovereignty will not in the end accept oligarchic judicial sovereignty as its governing predicate.

